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ILLINOIS ENERGY PROBLEMS: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Boyd R. Keenan
Governmental institutions wrestling with energy problems
—
ranging from American states to international organi-
zations — are like elements in a gigantic mobile. They
seem suspended in time and space, battered by erratic
winds. The least force affecting even a minor element
causes reactions in other parts of the mechanism.
More than two years after the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74
signaled the end of cheap fuel for the Western world,
the U.S. Congress and President Ford are still searching
for national energy management guidelines. For a time,
it was felt that attention to the place of the states in
national energy matters could wait until the federal
government hammered out firm policies. Now, however,
it has become increasingly clear that states must begin
to search for their own distinctive roles in the complex
energy mobile. It can only be hoped that initial plans
conceived by the states will mesh well with overarching
policies later devised in Washington.
The full scope of state responsibilities in energy affairs
cannot be assessed yet. But leaders in each state must
ask at least three basic questions: (1) How should the state
organize itself to protect its citizens against the emer-
gencies which could accompany severe fuel shortages
and even another oil embargo? (2) What does the state
have to offer to the nation at large in a time of long-range
energy shortages? and (3) What are the environmental
implications within the state of solutions to energy prob-
lems?
In the fall of 1973, when Arab nations cut the supply
of crude oil being delivered to the U.S., Illinois, like other
states, responded on a "crisis" basis. A "hot line" was
set up in the state Department of Agriculture, and personnel
there began assisting not only farmers in need of fuel,
but also industries, independent gasoline dealers, and even
large oil companies that turned to the state for help in
coordination. When the broad dimensions of the allocation
problem became apparent, Illinois Governor Dan Walker
created the Office of the Illinois Energy Coordinator
and moved the hot line operation there. The agency
cooperated with the new Federal Energy Office — now
the Federal Energy Administration — during the near
chaotic period of the embargo.
Over the past two years other state agencies have also
implemented specific programs related to energy. On
April 1, 1975, Governor Walker centralized many of these
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activities in the nevy Division of Energy within the state
Department of Business and Economic Development (BED).
Among the new division's responsibilities were those
petroleum allocation tasks formerly handled by the Office
of the Energy Coordinator. The division was also charged
by the governor to provide leadership in such long-tange
matters as developing lllinois's coal reserves, creating
energy conservation programs, investigating alternative
energy sources, coordinating energy research within
Illinois, and establishing coal research centers in the
state.
Thus, the Division of Energy is presently the keystone
of the executive branch's organizational response to the
energy crisis, although virtually all state departments and
agencies have been forced to face their own problems.
In a perhaps unprecedented manner the General Assembly
has sought to meet many of the same problems through
legislative action. At times the distinct approaches of
the two branches have resulted in collisions with strong
political overtones.
Illinois Energy Resources
Illinois is mentioned increasingly as possessing both
natural and human resources critical to the nation at large
in energy affairs, the result of a combination of geological,
historical, and political circumstances. During World War
II, the city of Chicago was the site of early research and
planning on the fabled Manhattan Project, which produced
the first atomic bomb. In large measure the presence of
federal and university nuclear laboratories near Chicago
can be traced to the wartime project. It was to be expected
that a Chicago public utility — Commonwealth Edison —
would become the first such company to develop a
civilian nuclear reactor. Today that firm possesses the
greatest nuclear capability of any utility in the nation,
and Illinois relies more heavily on nuclear generation of
electrical power than does any other state.
lllinois's prominence in nuclear energy was an expected
development. It was the recognition in 1973 of the nation's
dependence on foreign oil, however, that brought sudden
and renewed attention to an even older and more plentiful
energy source in the state — coal. Over the past two years,
Illinois citizens have been subjected to a bewildering
array of proposals for exploiting the state's massive coal
reserves for the benefit of its own residents and the nation.
For a long time geologists have known that Illinois
possesses the largest bituminous (soft) coal reserves
of any state, estimated at between 140 and 150 billion
tons. They argue over just how much energy these reserves
represent in terms of oil "equivalency." Some contend that
as much potential energy is locked in Illinois coal as is
contained in the oil reserves of the Middle East.
One of the most striking ironies of our technological
age is the fact that the bituminous coal of Illinois and
several neighboring states became unacceptable for use
shortly before the embargo and the accompanying quin-
tupling of crude oil prices. In the late 1960s scientists had
discovered possible health hazards from sulphur oxides.
Most of lllinois's vast coal reserves have a high sulphur
content. As early as 1969 environmentally conscious law-
makers in Congress and in the Illinois General Assembly
began to enact legislation which discouraged or in some
cases prohibited burning Illinois coal for generating
electricity or other purposes. For instance, power plants
in Chicago and even in cities of more moderate size were
ordered to discontinue their use of Illinois coal. As a
consequence, in the early 1970s many public utilities
and other industries which had depended upon Illinois
coal either made expensive conversions to oil and/or
natural gas burners or began transporting low-sulphur
coal from western states. Transportation costs in moving
this coal to Illinois and other Midwest states became a
burden on both public utilities and consumers. Of the
coal burned by electric utilities in Illinois, western coal's
share increased from 3.7 percent in 1970 to nearly 25
percent in 1974.'
New elements were introduced into this situation, in
Illinois and elsewhere, by the embargo, which led to
skyrocketing oil prices. The risk to national security in
relying on imported fuels became obvious. Adding to
the irony was the diminishing supply of natural gas,
praised by environmentalists as the "cleanest" fuel which
could be used.
All these factors, particularly the realization of the
country's growing dependence upon foreign oil, led
Congress and federal agencies to fund dramatic research
and development (R&D) programs in 1974 and 1975.
Critical in these efforts is the aim of developing tech-
nologies which will permit safe utilization of high-sulphur
coal such as that available in abundance in Illinois.
Suddenly experimental processes for coal gasification
and liquefaction, formerly known only to chemists and
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engineers, became familiar to government leaders and
politicians.
Illinois Coal Development Program
In January 1974 the second session of the Seventy-eighth
Illinois General Assembly convened and Governor Walker
delivered his second annual State of the State message.
The governor's sweeping proposals for energy legislation
included a plan to develop ways to use lllinois's vast
soft coal reserves. His eight-point energy program was
acclaimed by legislative leaders of both parties. Once the
legislators began studying the governor's proposals, how-
ever, the complexity of the energy area and the competing
forces at work precluded substantive agreement. Under-
standably, legislators argued among themselves and
with the governor over control of state energy programs,
particularly those elements dealing with coal development.
In June 1974, during the final hours of the session,
the General Assembly passed compromise legislation in
the form of four specific energy bills. On August 19
Governor Walker signed these bills into law. Central to
the package was Senate Bill 1659, authorizing the sale
of $70 million in state bonds to be used for coal develop-
ment projects. It called for BED to administer the bonding
authority. The same law also established the Illinois
Energy Advisory Council on Coal Development to advise
BED on the development of Illinois coal reserves. Chaired
by the governor, the council includes as members the
lieutenant governor and directors of state departments
and agencies relevant to coal development.
A second law, House Bill 2651, established the Illinois
Energy Resources Commission, composed of ten legis-
lators and eight public members. Before BED can fund
projects through its bonding authority, the commission
must give its approval. The commission is also charged
to develop an overall long-range plan for Illinois energy
and to investigate all phases of energy use and develop-
ment within the state.
Another measure, Senate Bill 1667, allows BED to
utilize the right of eminent domain in acquiring or using
land for coal development. This measure amends the
Act to Provide for the Exercise of the Right of Eminent
Domain, which dates from 1872. A final law, Senate Bill
1660, appropriated $10 million in "operational" funds to
BED from the $70 million coal development fund authorized
in Senate Bill 1659.
From the outset it was clear that the legislature's efforts
to provide checks and balances in the management of
Illinois would result in two major rival bodies. One —
the BED'S Division of Energy — would be the spokesman
for the executive branch of government. The other —
the Energy Resources Commission — would mainly
reflect the attitudes of those in the legislative branch.
The latter condition prevails because all appointments to
the commission — including the eight public members
— are made by the legislative leaders of both parties.
When considered together, the statutes appear to create
a system whereby only BED can propose funding for
coal development and only the commission can approve
such funding. The law does provide, however, that a
grant under the bonding authority which is recommended
by BED is made automatically if the commission fails
to approve or disapprove a proposal within forty-five
days after it is submitted.
Even before the measures became law, it had become
evident that massive new industrial consortia — powerful
energy corporations fortified with multimillion dollar federal
grants — would be seeking parcels of the available
$70 million. Given the emotional character of the emerging
energy politics, it was inevitable that the executive branch,
principally through BED, and the legislatively oriented
commission would be pitted against each other. Even in
the most congenial political setting, it is probable that
officials in the executive branch and representatives of
the General Assembly, irrespective of party, would have
vied for credit in bringing coal development projects
to Illinois.
But relationships have been far from congenial as the
BED'S Division of Energy and the commission have wrestled
with requests from energy consortia to tap the bond fund
for the development of coal conversion facilities in Illinois.
The Illinois Energy Advisory Council, also established
by the 1974 energy package, does not seem to have been
active. The council's purpose, as defined by statute, is
to advise BED and generally give counsel in state energy
affairs. Critics of the governor, chairman of the council,
contend that he has failed to convene the body regularly
because of an unwillingness to share the energy "spotlight"
with the lieutenant governor, vice-chairman of the council.
Like the governor, the latter is a Democrat, but the two
high state officials represent different factions of the party.
The governor's defenders maintain that heavy reliance on
the council would obstruct energy planning.
Inadvertently or by intent, the General Assembly appears
to have harnessed, by statute, three new energy units which
have similar mandates and objectives but which relate
to totally different constituencies. Despite the rivalries
among BED, the commission, and the council, Illinois
appears to be one of the more successful coal-producing
states seeking to create lucrative coal utilization industries
within their borders. The state's most important boost
came on November 17, 1975, when the federal Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA)
announced that an Illinois site was its choice for the
location of the nation's first major demonstration coal
conversion plant. The proposed $237 million facility
would convert sulphur-tainted coal into synthetic gas and
fuel oil. The plant would be constructed by Coalcon
Corporation of New York City on a 2,000-acre site just
east of New Athens, twenty-five miles southeast of East
St. Louis.
After ERDA announced its selection, Governor Walker
stated that the willingness of the state executive branch
to contribute $25 million in coal development bond funds
to the Coalcon project was the key to the choice of the
New Athens site. At this writing (December 1975), the
Illinois Energy Resources Commission is awaiting BED's
formal request — with technical supporting data — for
approval of the $25 million.
The commission has already committed funds to the
one formal proposal submitted by BED. On November 5,
1975, the commission approved BED's recommendation
that $10 million be awarded a consortium headed by the
General Electric Corporation to develop an experimental
coal-burning system. The R&D effort will utilize existing
facilities of the Illinois Power Company near East St.
Louis.
Strain on Federal System
The scope of the nation's broad energy dilemma is illus-
trated well by complexities attached to the state's plight
in wrestling with the coal development problem. When the
Illinois legislative energy package was enacted in the final
hours of the 1974 session, the state and the nation were
still in a state of shock following the Arab embargo.
Among the new complexities which this situation has
led to is competition among coal-producing states for the
initial coal conversion plants. Rivalry in obtaining these
facilities is understandable — their location may very
well determine where huge new technological industries
will be centered. Such rivalry could exert an almost un-
precedented strain on our federal system. At a time when
all agree that our national needs match those felt in a
full-scale war, intrastate and interstate conflicts could
affect the national interest adversely. It is hoped that these
tensions will lead to a healthy reality, not a bitterness
among the actors involved.
In Illinois, leaders in both the executive and legislative
branches of state government are likely to become more
realistic in their quest for the new industry. When the
package of energy bills was passed in 1974, leaders
felt that the state could rather easily strengthen the nation's
energy posture while financially benefitting itself and its
citizens through development of coal reserves. The months
have shown, however, that even though Illinois does boast
the largest reserves of bituminous coal in the nation,
it is not unique among the states. Other coal-producing
states are proclaiming their own uniqueness in coal
opportunities.
It is inevitable that unpredictable social and political
factors will be in play when sites for coal conversion
facilities are selected. This reality is only one facet of the
incredibly complex set of problems faced by Illinois and
other states in constructing state energy policies which
both protect the interests of their citizens and are consistent
with broader national interests.
Relevance of World Economics
There is a striking difference between the plight of states
now seeking R&D installations and of states which in the
1960s competed for scientific plums like nuclear acceler-
ators and space laboratories. Today, the state of the world
economy is hauntingly relevant. Shifts in international
oil pricing could upset the most carefully conceived state
plans dramatically. For perhaps the first time, state
governments must devise long-range technological poli-
cies which could be disrupted by sudden changes in
the behavior of international organizations over which
the states have no control. Most critical of these groups,
of course, is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC), the price-fixing cartel whose success
in late 1973 stimulated the Western world's search for
alternative energy sources.
Since the emergence of OPEC as a major force in world
politics, rumors have persisted that the cartel was at the
point of disintegration. For a time the U.S. federal govern-
ment seemed to encourage such speculation. At present,
however, State Department officials and other governmental
spokesmen leave the impression that coexistence with
OPEC over many years is inevitable. Yet, states attempting
to create new coal conversion industries know that any
breakup of the cartel would result in a sharp decrease in
world oil prices. If this should happen, industry in the
U.S. and other Western countries — unless strongly
encouraged by governmental policies to do otherwise —
would rely once again on cheap oil and would ignore the
expensive oil substitutes derived from coal gasification
and liquification.
Such an eventuality — and the accompanying risks —
lurk in the minds of American investors who are studying
the wisdom of placing capital in coal conversion ventures.
It is recognition of the risks and the related issue of
national security which have led to the host of proposals
from Washington and other Western -capitals to help
meet uncertainties. Among the projects being planned
in this country, of course, are those based on the notion
that both the federal government and coal-producing
states should share the risk in these new ventures. The
possible scale of federal involvement in such efforts
is suggested by President Ford's proposal, made public
on September 22, 1975, for the creation of a new national
corporation — the Energy Independence Authority (EIA).
Under this plan, EIA would channel $100 billion into energy
projects over the next decade.
International economists are divided on such ambitious
plans for coal conversion facilities. Some feel there is no
alternative but to develop them. Others fear that an un-
expected decline in world oil prices could leave the
U.S. landscape strewn with white elephants in the form
of unfinished gasification and liquification plants.
It is too early to speculate on the success of President
Ford's efforts to convince Congress of the necessity of
the EIA or similar plans. It is not too early, however, for
states to begin preparing for the new federal-state relation-
ships, as well as intrastate tensions which are likely to
evolve.
Energy-Environment Debate in Illinois
In Illinois, tensions will be produced by long-standing
conflicts between "no-growth" environmentalists, on the
one hand, and coal developers and public utilities, on
the other. The latter believe the interests of the state and
the nation at large would be served by creating a new
coal conversion industry in Illinois. The movement toward
such a new industry has been mounted so quickly that
many environmentalists have been caught off guard.
When they begin to study in depth the total environmental
impacts of large conversion plants, they will probably
introduce new factors into the energy-environmental debate.
Among their concerns will be water, an abundant supply
of which is needed by any conversion plant, and possible
encroachment upon highly valued agricultural land. Inter-
action among social, economic, and political forces in
Illinois on the coal conversion issue will be a microcosm
of broader, deeply felt ideological conflicts which are
beginning to rage across the country
— indeed around
the world. Proponents of no-growth conservation ap-
proaches to our energy problems will probably oppose
those who favor technological solutions.
More than most states, Illinois is like a laboratory where
efforts to resolve energy-environmental conflicts may be
viewed by the entire country. In 1970 the General Assembly
won the attention of ecologists around the nation with
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a set of laws acclaimed as the most environmentally
advanced efforts in the country. When in 1974 the energy
measures described above were passed, many legislators
were beginning to feel that their earlier environmental
package was destructive to the state and national economic
health.
Concrete evidence of a change in legislative attitudes
came several months ago, when the General Assembly
approved a bill which environmentalists construe as re-
versing the Illinois direction set by the 1970 actions. In
the face of opposition from environmentalists, Governor
Walker signed Senate Bill 805, which requires "economic
impact statements" for environmental regulations estab-
lished by the Illinois Pollution Control Board Evidence
that the entire country will be watching Illinois comes
from a variety of technical and scientific journals which
have given the matter attention. An illustration of the level
of national interest is the following item from Chemical
Week:
Before promulgating any environmental regulation, the Illinois
Pollution Control Board must now prepare an economic impact
statement under an amendment to the state's Environmental
Protection Act, believed to be the first such provision in the
nation. Statement preparation is expected to cost the Pollution
Control Board over $500,000/year, 2
The dynamics of energy-environmental politics in Illinois
over the coming years are likely to challenge the ingenuity
of state executives and lawmakers as never before. It is
hoped that their responses not only will meet the state's
needs, but also will provide helpful models for other states
in struggles to find their own niches in both energy and
environmental management within the broader national
system.
Conclusion
The need for state leaders to strike out on their own in
understanding their states' distinct energy roles can hardly
be overstated. Although it is indeed true that society is
analogous to a fragile mobile composed of interrelated
energy components, each unit in the system has unique
characteristics. For example, Illinois — with its abundance
of coal and highly advanced nuclear reactors — will
require knowledge and expertise different from that needed
in states which seek to exploit offshore oil and gas reserves.
The geography of the country is such that natural clusterings
of states may encourage regional cooperation in attacking
some energy issues. But as long as states remain integral
parts of our federal system, day-to-day management of
energy problems will rest heavily upon individual states.
In the remaining years of this century there can be no
substitute for state-oriented leadership in managing
energy in Illinois and elsewhere.
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